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Papers
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Reviews
Books
Knowing the Structure of Nature: Essays on Realism and Explanation, Palgrave -MacMillan, 2009. Click
here
for the Table of Contents + Chapter 1+ Index Επιστήμη και Αλήθεια: Δοκίμια στη Φιλοσοφία της Επιστήμης, Εκδόσεις Οκτώ Science
and Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Science, Okto Publishers The Routledge
Companion to the Philosophy of Science (with
martin Curd), Routledge 2008. Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2008. Here is a review
of RCPS by Roman Frigg (Metascience) Reviews
'With a distinguished list of internationally renowned contributors,
an excellent choice of topics in the field, and well-written, well-edited
essays throughout, this compendium is an excellent resource. It will work
well for any serious scholar inside or outside the field interested in the
current state of philosophy of science. Highly recommended.' - CHOICE, Sept. 2008 'Here is philosophy of science the way it should be. In these pages
some of the very best philosophers working today grapple with the big issues
of metaphysics, language, and epistemology as they relate to science. This
volume is a true introduction to a philosophy of science that has real
stature; a philosophy of science that puts the subject at the crossing point
of arguments from across the intellectual landscape.' - Peter Galison, Harvard University, USA 'This is an outstanding companion. With over fifty chapters by
uniformly distinguished contributors, it offers a stimulating and often
original introduction to every facet of the subject. There is no better guide
to the philosophy of science on the market.' - David Papineau, King's College London ‘This well conceived and comprehensive volume brings together a
remarkable collection of authors, including many of the leading contemporary
contributors to the philosophy of science. It will be of great value to students
of the philosophy of science at all levels.’ - John Dupré, University of Exeter, UK Λογική: Η Δομή του Επιχειρήματος, Νεφέλη 2007 (με τους Δημήτρη Πορτίδη και
Διονύση Αναπολιτάνο) (Logic: The Structure of Argument, Nefeli 2007 (co-authored with Demetris Portides and D A Anapolitanos)). Here is a
review of it by Aris Arageorgis (in Greek) Philosophy
of Science A-Z,
Edinburgh University Press, 2007 This is a dictionary: from A priori to
Elie Zahar. From a review in Philosophy in Review (Daniel McArthur) (…) Psillos has done as good a job as can be at
making the volume as useful as possible to the largest number of readers in
the field. For a graduate student contemplating a career in the field the
book will be indispensable and professionals will also make much use of it.
For anyone else just interested in learning a little about the major
developments in the field, Philosophy
of Science A-Z is simply the best book on the market right now. The scope
of the book is very surprising given its manageable length. Specialist and
student readers alike will greet
Philosophy of Science A-Z with enthusiasm and it will be much read for a
long time to come. Here is a review
by Howard Sankey (forthcoming Philosophy of Science) Here is a review of
my A-Z in Greek by Kostas Krimbas. Causation and Explanation, Acumen & McGill-Queens U.P., 2002. Winner of the BSPS Presidents’
Award 2004 Click here for the Table of Contents and the Introduction. Reviewed: Metascience (James Ladyman) Philosophy of Science (Ingo Brigandt) Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Phil Dowe) Philosophical Books (David H. Sanford) Nefsis (Eleni Manolakaki) Scientific Realism:
How Science Tracks Truth,1999, Routledge. (2nd impression 2002) Click
here to read the Introduction. Here
for the Table of Contents. Symposium on Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth:
"Quests for a Realist", Metascience 10, No. 3, pp. 341-71. (Symposiasts:
Michael Redhead, Peter Lipton, Igor Douven, Otavio Bueno. Reviewed: Ratio (Alexander Bird) Philosophical
Books (Marc Lange) Mind (Jarrett Leplin) International
Journal of Philosophical Studies (Patrick
Enfield) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Brian Ellis) Philosophical
Review (Jerry Doppelt)
Interviews
Here is a piece about what it is to be a modern
Greek philosopher—by Kathryn Koromilas for the magazine Odyssey. Here is an interview
about Philosophy of Science—to appear in Robert Rosenberger (ed.) 5 Questions in Philosophy of Science, Automatic Press/VIP. Work in Progress
Papers Here is a paper on the philosophy of causation of the Scottish philosopher Thomas Brown. Books I am in the process of writing a book on empiricism—better empiricisms. It will come out by Acumen in due course. Here is the entry on empiricism in my Philosophy of Science A to Z. Empiricism The view that
experience is the only source of information about the world. Though many
empiricists have taken this claim to be constitutive of empiricism, this way
of putting the view makes it a factual claim about the genesis of knowledge,
and it may be best to characterise empiricism as the view that experience is
(ought to be) the only source of justification for substantive claims about
the world. Empiricism is the rival of rationalism. Interestingly, empirics
were called a post-Hippocratic school of medicine, under the leadership of
Philinos of Cos and Serapion of Alexandria, which claimed that all medical
knowledge arises out of a) one’s own observations; b) the observations of
others; and c) analogical reasoning. They were opposed to dogmatists.
Bacon compared empirics with ants (since they collect only experimental
results) and dogmatists with spiders (‘who make cobwebs out of their own
substance’). His own alternative (his new empiricism) was compared to bees:
the experimental data were transformed to knowledge by reason, following the
scientific method. Empiricism took its modern form by Locke, Berkeley and
Hume. Yet, their disagreement on a number of issues (are there abstract
ideas? can we distinguish between primary and secondary qualities? can things
exist unperceived? can there be causal knowledge?) highlights the fact that
empiricism is far from being a solid and tight doctrine. However, we can say
that empiricism is characterised by the rejection of synthetic a priori
knowledge and by a disdain towards metaphysics—since the latter is supposed
to transcend experience and whatever can be known on its basis. Leibniz
famously claimed that we are all empiricists in ‘three-quarters of our
actions’, but he took the fourth quarter (viz., the knowledge of first
principles and in particular the knowledge of necessary truths) to require
the adoption of other (non empirical) modes of knowing. The empiricist camp
has been divided over this matter. Though there is unanimity that there can
be no substantive knowledge of the world by the lights of reason only, some
empiricists (notably Mill and Quine) have taken the view that all truths
(even the truths of logic and mathematics) are synthetic and a posteriori,
while others (notably Carnap and other followers of logical positivism) have
taken the view that there is a special category of non-empirical truths which
are knowlable a priori—but they are analytic truths and hence do not require
a special faculty of rational insight or intuition. Among the radical empiricists
who take all knowledge to be a posteriori, there are those (like Mill) who
think that all knowledge arises out of experience by means of induction (and
it is justified on this basis) and those (like Quine) who take experience to
regulate a system of beliefs by exerting negative control on it—when there is
conflict between the system of beliefs and experience, there must be suitable
adjustments to this system to restore coherence, governed by general
principles such as the principle of minimal mutilation. Empiricists have
disagreed over: the exact limits of experience (do they include whatever is
actually observed or whatever is observable, and if the latter, observable by
whom? Me, us, any human being, God?); the legitimacy and the scope of the
methods which start from experience (is induction justified? If not, is
scepticism inevitable for empiricists? Is reasoning by analogy legitimate and
can the analogy be extended to entities that cannot be experienced, e.g., to
unobservable entities?); the content of experience (is this composed of sense
data or are material objects directly experienced?) It might then be best to
talk of empiricisms, united by a call to place experience firmly at
the heart of our cognitive give-and-take with the world. Projects with former and current students With Demetra Christopoulou: Frege and neo-logicism. (Papers in Greek: Frege; neologicism) With Nikos Bisketzis:
A paper on the Simpson paradox and its implications for probabilistic
causation. Click here to
see it (in Greek; Nefsis, volume 16) With Aspassia Kanelou:
we have been working on intentional realism—and a bit on concepts. With Milena Ivanova: An introduction to Duhem’s philosophy of Science (in Greek), which has appeared as an appendix in the Greek translation of Duhem’s To Save the Phenomena. Click here for the final version. Papers
Forthcoming “An
Explorer upon Untrodden Ground: Peirce on Abduction” Handbook of the History of Logic
Volume 10 -- Inductive Logic (John Woods,
Dov Gabbay και Stephan Hartmann eds.) Elsevier “On Reichenbach’s Argument for Scientific Realism” Synthese
“Choosing
the Realist Framework”, Synthese ‘Living
with the Abstract: Realism and Models’, Synthese. ‘Causal Pluralism’, in Robrecht Vanderbeeken & Bart D’Hooghe (eds.) Worldviews, Science and Us:
Studies of Analytical Metaphysics: A Selection of Topics From a
Methodological Perspective, World
Scientific Publishers. . Click here
for the paper. ‘Causation
and Regularity’ in Oxford Handbook
of Causation, Helen Beebee, Peter Menzies & Chris Hitchcock, (eds.) Oxford University Press. 2009 ‘The
A Priori: Between Conventions and Implicit Definitions, (με την Δήμητρα Χριστοπούλου) in The
A Priori and its
Role in Philosophy,
Nikola Kompa, Christian Nimtz, Christian Suhm (eds.) Mentis, 2009, 205-220. 2008
2007
“Reflections
on Conceptual Change” in Stella Vosniadou, Aristides Baltas and Xenia Vamvakoussi (eds) Reframing the Conceptual Change
Approach in Learning and Instruction 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. “Causal Explanation and Manipulation” in Johannes Person & Petri Ylikoski (eds). Rethinking Explanation, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 252. Springer 2007, pp. 97-112. “Realism”, “Causal
Law”, “Inference”, “Reference”, “Nicod’s Criterion”, “Philosophy of Science”
in A Dictionary of Critical Realism, Mervyn Hartwig (ed.),
Routledge, 2007. 2006 “The Structure, the Whole Structure and Nothing but the
Structure?”, Philosophy of Science 73, 2006,
σσ.
560–570. Ramsey’s
Ramsey-sentences in Cambridge and Vienna:
Frank P Ramsey and the Vienna Circle (Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 12),
(ed. Maria Carla
Galavotti), 2006, Springer, pp. 67-90. ‘Stephen
Mumford’s Laws in Nature’ Metascience (part of a symposium
on Stephen Mumford’s book Laws in Nature.)
2005
Gale MacMillan Reference, 2005.
2005.
. 2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1997
1996
1995 'Is
Structural Realism the Best of Both Worlds?', Dialectica, 1995, 49,
pp.15-46.
'The Cognitive
Interplay Between Theories and Models: The Case of 19th Century Optics', in
W. E. Herfel, W. Krajewski, I. Niiniluoto & R. Wojcicki (eds.) Theories
and Models in Scientific Processes, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of
the Sciences and the Humanities, 44, pp. 105-133. 1994
1992
Book Reviews
Forthcoming
2008
2007
2005
2004
2002
2001
Review
of Kukla, A. Studies
in Scientific Realism, The Foundations of Chemistry, 3,
pp.79-86. Review
of Giere, R. Science
Without Laws, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science,
15:1 (March 2001), pp. 102-105 2000 Review
of Wilson, F. The Logic And Methodology of Science in Early Modern Thought,
Philosophy in Review, XX, No.6, pp.447-449. 'Review
of Richardson, A. Carnap's Construction of the World, MIND, 109,
pp.986-990. World
According to Flux of Tropes' (Review of Niiniluoto, I. Critical Scientific
Realism) The Times Higher Education Supplement, 6 October 2000, p.
29. 1999 Review of Gower, B: Theories
of Scientific Method, Ratio, XII, pp.310-316. 1998
1996
1995
1994
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